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ABSTRACT
DANIEL GUSTAFSON: Peace to Violence: Explaining the Violent Escalation of
Nonviolent Demonstrations
(Under the direction of Stephen E. Gent.)
Under what conditions do nonviolent demonstrations escalate to violence? I answer this
question using a novel theory of individual preference formation in protests that begin
peacefully. Rather than considering protest groups as unitary actors, I present a theory of
collective action in which a group’s decision is the product of a probabilistic aggregation of
individual preferences. I argue that individuals involved in a nonviolent demonstration use
the immediacy of their needs and the sustainability of collective action to decide whether
or not to initiate violence against the state. Specifically, I hypothesize that the likelihood
of violent escalation will increase when the relative food price is high, a demonstration is
rural, and the event is spontaneous. An analysis of nonviolent demonstrations in Africa and
Latin America largely supports my expectations.
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INTRODUCTION
During the collapse of the Soviet Union, several communist populaces mounted campaigns
of political opposition. These contentious movements varied cross-nationally in their tacti-
cal choices and abilities to force government concessions. Some states, such as Czechoslo-
vakia during the Velvet Revolution, saw large and rapid governmental changes as a result
of nonviolent demonstrations. Others, like Romania, saw protests change to riots and cause
the eventual overthrow of the communist regime. Why do some nonviolent demonstra-
tions remain peaceful while others escalate to violence? I argue that during periods of civil
opposition, nonviolent demonstrations are more likely to become violent when individual
members are impatient or believe that collective action is unsustainable.
Rather than considering protest groups as unitary actors, I present a theory of collective
action in which a group’s decision is the product of a probabilistic aggregation of individual
preferences. I argue that individuals involved in a nonviolent demonstration use the imme-
diacy of their needs and the sustainability of collective action to decide whether or not to
initiate violence against the state.
Specifically, I explore the relative food price of a country, location of the event, and
whether the demonstration was spontaneous or organized as determinants of violent es-
calation. First, lower food prices in a country should allow nonviolent demonstrations to
continue using peaceful tactics to attempt to force concessions. Higher food prices may
necessitate a switch to violent tactics because the need for nutrition must be immediately
resolved. Second, nonviolent events in centralized urban areas are more easily able to over-
come barriers to collective action and begin demonstrations. Additionally, urban areas allow
an individual’s participation in nonviolent activities to be complementary—encouraging
sustainable demonstration. Peaceful demonstrations in rural settings have less potential
participants for large protests and should be unlikely to form sustainable nonviolent action,
leading members to consider violence more frequently. Finally, organized demonstrations
demonstrate that leaders have borne the costs of collective action, signalling the sustain-
ability of nonviolent action. Conversely, the duration of spontaneous protests is highly
uncertain and may cause demonstrators to consider a switch to violent tactics before collec-
tive action collapses.
In this study, I briefly consider the extant literature on civil contention and tactical
choices. Next, I present my theory of individual preference aggregation and violent es-
calation. I follow my argument with a research design to empirically test my hypotheses,
and I present the results of my statistical analysis of 3,347 nonviolent events in Africa and
Latin America from 2000-2014. I find strong support for my hypotheses relating to the
impact of relative food price and demonstration spontaneity on violent escalation. I find
mixed results for my hypothesis on the event location’s role in causing a violent outbreak.
I close this project with a discussion of my findings and suggestions for future work.
Civil Opposition and Tactical Choices
Scholars have increasingly focused on why civil opposition occurs, and several studies
can be separated into two discrete camps based upon whether they argue that the causes
of conflict are motivational or environmental (Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner 2009).1 Mo-
tivational theories generally refer to arguments that explore rebels’ reasons to violently
mobilize. Some argue that opposition groups are fundamentally driven to express dissat-
isfaction with the government based upon deeply held grievances (Gurr 2000; Sambanis
2001). Under this framework, aggrieved individuals make the strategic decision to oppose
the state in an attempt to redress their grievances. Other research, however, suggest that
rebels are motivated solely by economic incentives (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Regan and
Norton 2005).
A growing body of literature suggests that food insecurity is a key cause of grievance
1 Although the majority of scholarly work on political conflict has explored rebellion and other violent
tactics, similar mechanisms generate all sorts of contentious political action (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly
2003).
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formation. While scholars have explored this topic in the past (Tilly 1971), protests and
riots have been an incredibly common manifestation of political opposition in recent his-
tory, and scholars have taken notice. (Brinkman & Hendrix 2011, Salehyan et al. 2012).
Indeed, studies have shown that food prices are significant predictors of food riots (Belle-
mare 2015), antigovernment demonstrations (Arezki and Bruckner 2011), and urban unrest
in democratic countries (Hendrix and Haggard 2015).
Arguments that rely on greed or grievance are often contrasted with environmental the-
ories of conflict. In these studies, the key explanatory factor of civil war onset is the fea-
sibility of conflict. For example, Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that conditions that favor
insurgency—such as mountainous terrain or natural resources—increase the likelihood of
civil war. Walter (2004) argues that civil war is more likely to occur in states that have a
history of civil conflict. Theoretically, these studies of civil war onset have given us several
different avenues through which conflict can emerge. Empirically, however, findings are
seemingly tenuous and almost always contradicting other results. Because of this, scholars
often choose to pair empirical analyses of conflict with strong theoretical models.
Since Fearon (1995) introduced his rationalist explanations for conflict and the bargain-
ing model of war, rationalist studies have focused on information issues and incentives to
misrepresent (Fearon 1997; Schultz 1998; Wagner 2000) or commitment problems (Kydd
2003; Powell 2006, 2012) as the primary causes of international conflict. Civil conflict
scholars have also applied these concepts to their work to capture strategic interactions and
bargaining between states and nonstate actors (Bapat 2006; Bell and Wolford 2015; Schultz
2010; Walter 2002). Very few studies, however, consider nonviolent actors in a rationalist
framework.2 This lack of strategic theorizing has impeded knowledge on the dynamics of
tactical selection.
Conventionally, studies of contentious politics have classified substate actors into two
categories—those that use violence as a tactic and those that do not. International relations
scholars often implicitly assume this dichotomous distinction because they conceptualize
nonviolent and violent groups as fundamentally different. A growing vein of scholarship
2 A notable exception is Cunningham (2013).
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challenges this assumption (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013). Indeed, Asal et al. (2013) re-
ject this false dichotomy and suggest that groups may choose from a full ‘menu’ of tactics
including solely violent, solely nonviolent, or mixed strategies. Cunningham (2013) finds
that there are several factors that positively affect the likelihood of a group using violence
or nonviolence and concludes that it is possible that the same causal mechanism may drive
a group to take organized action, and the environment in which the group finds itself may
determine the most appropriate tactical approach.
Another common assumption in much of the conflict literature lies in the idea that vio-
lent tactics are necessarily more effective in achieving a desired outcome than nonviolence.3
Some scholars, however, have challenged this assumption by presenting evidence that non-
violent groups may be more successful than violent groups (Celestino and Gleditsch 2013;
Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Karatnycky and Ackerman 2005).
The extant literature suggests that two common sets of nonviolent tactics exist. First,
a group may opt to use traditional political means—such as voting or lobbying—to try to
redress its grievances. These routine activities, however, are often insufficient because the
group may be too weak to meaningfully influence domestic politics (Celestino and Gled-
itsch 2013; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). In autocracies or politically underdeveloped
regimes, there is usually very little space for traditional political opposition, so groups must
act extra-institutionally (Tarrow 1994). Second, a group can use nonviolent “direct action”
in the form of demonstrations or boycotts to affect politics (Celestino and Gleditsch 2013,
389). Direct action is more common in turbulent political environments and is often a nat-
ural second choice for groups excluded from the standard political process.
While a group may begin by using only violence or nonviolence, it may vary its tactics
over time. Although studies of violent and nonviolent movements answer important ques-
tions relating to conflict dynamics, very little work has explored the reasons that groups
change their broad strategies of opposition. In addition, it is unclear in the current litera-
ture why single events change from peaceful demonstrations to antigovernment violence.
3 In this context, nonviolence is defined as “strategic nonviolent resistance,” which should be under-
stood as separate from principled nonviolence which is informed by ethical or spiritual notions (Stephan
and Chenoweth 2008, 10).
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This project contributes to the study of civil conflict by presenting a novel theory of vio-
lent escalation. It addresses the broad literature on tactical choices, bargaining, and conflict
prevention.
Theoretical Setup
I conceptualize the strategic interaction between a state and opponent during a nonvio-
lent demonstration, as the opposition group tries to extract concessions from the state while
the government seeks an end to opposition. I assume that the opposition group cannot re-
dress its grievances through traditional political institutions. Politically excluded groups try
to express opposition opinions and bargain for concessions by acting unconventionally—
through protest (Tarrow 1994) or armed conflict (Wagner 2000).
Empirically, some groups begin as violent entities. However, I assume that all else
equal, individuals would prefer to reach their goals nonviolently. The opposition group’s
primary goal is to coerce concessions from the government while remaining nonviolent.
The costs of participating in violence are high and often entail risking one’s life, creating a
significant collective action problem (Lichbach 1995). For that reason, I assume that indi-
viduals prefer to use violence only as a last resort.
I assume that a state has three distinct options when responding to a nonviolent oppo-
sition demonstration—it may delay, concede, or repress. It may delay any decision in the
hopes that the opposition group is unresolved and relents. I assume that the government
strongly prefers this action because it is low cost, but it is potentially risky. Eventually, the
demonstration may gain mass support or begin using violence, meaning that the govern-
ment can no longer ignore it.
By delaying, the state trades short-term cost for long-term risk. Rather than conceding
to the group or repressing it immediately, the state allows the group to continue demonstrat-
ing, which can increase it’s support domestically and abroad. Nonviolent groups are more
likely to win concessions from the state in the long-term because they inflict consistent
costs on the state by disrupting economic activity and occupying security personnel. These
costs can be bearable in the short term but weaken the state as time goes on. Therefore,
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I argue that before the state chooses to take action, it prefers to delay in the hope that the
demonstration breaks up. This strategy is not ideal for the state as it still suffers the costs of
opposition, but it is the best alternative in the short term. Additionally, I argue that govern-
ment delay can have the unintended consequence of encouraging a nonviolent opposition
group to embrace violent tactics.
If the state chooses to take action against a nonviolent group that does not relent, it must
decide to either repress or offer conciliatory policies. While the government’s strategy in
this interaction is important for the dynamics of civil opposition, I choose to explicitly focus
on the nonstate actors’ decisions in this project. Thus, assuming that an opposition group
initiates nonviolent direct action and the state chooses to delay, under what conditions do
demonstrations escalate to violence?
Traditionally, conflict scholars have treated the strategic interaction between actors en-
gaged in conflict as a bargaining process. These models have produced invaluable insights,
but they often require two simplifying assumptions that are problematic for modelling the
interaction between a government and a civil opposition group. First, scholars would likely
assume that negotiations occur between two homogeneous units. In a civil conflict setting,
a bargaining model would likely treat the process as a series of decisions made by a gov-
ernment and the leaders of an opposition group. Empirically, leaders often negotiate with
governments over concessions, but they do not necessarily make decisions that produce
observable behavior. For example, if a leader agrees to cease violence in exchange for con-
cessions, she may not be able to enforce this agreement. Some leaders certainly can exert
strong influence over their members, but I would argue that this is sort of cohesion is rare.
In fact, scholars have found that divergent preferences lead most contentious campaigns to
fragment over time (Christia 2012; Cunningham 2011). Thus, I consider a model in which
decisions are driven by individual members’ preferences but can be constrained by the ex-
tent to which leaders organize demonstrations.
Second, bargaining models may be subject to an exogenous risk of negotiation break-
down (Muthoo 1999). Under this risk, actors may be compelled to reach a deal due to fear
that talks will fall apart, and the terms of the agreement may be altered. While bargaining
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partners may genuinely worry about exogenous breakdown, I would argue that it is inap-
propriate to apply this constraint to the interaction between a government and nonviolent
opposition group. Here, perhaps the most common form of breakdown occurs when the
nonviolent group turns violent. Therefore, the risk of bargaining breakdown is endogenous
because demonstrators themselves may force negotiations to fall apart. I explore a situation
in which individual members of a nonviolent opposition group drive bargaining breakdown
by deciding to escalate from peaceful demonstrations to violence.
Following previous studies of collective action, I consider a collection of individuals
who have preferences over oppositional tactics drawn from a random distribution (Chwe
2000; Siegel 2009). The aggregation of these demonstrators’ preferences produce the ob-
served behavior of the group in a probabilistic manner. For example, if a majority of individ-
uals in a demonstration prefer to continue acting nonviolently, the group will likely remain
nonviolent. As the amount of individuals that prefer switching to violence increases, the
group becomes increasingly likely to become violent. I argue that an individual opposition
member prefers to switch to violent tactics as her needs become more immediate or the per-
ceived sustainability of collection action decreases. Therefore, groups with large amounts
of impatient members are more likely to escalate nonviolent civil opposition to violence.
Impatience and the Sustainability of Collective Action
I argue that the underlying reason that nonviolent groups escalate to violence lies in
the aggregation of individual preferences over tactics within the group. Because of this, it
is important to consider the conditions under which constituent group members are likely
to prefer changing tactics. Individuals situated within a nonviolent opposition movement
are more inclined to prefer escalating to violent contention when they are impatient with
nonviolent tactics. I argue that if they no longer believe that their needs will be satisfied
via peaceful demonstration or if they believe that collective action is unsustainable, oppo-
sition group members will be more apt to switch to violent tactics as a last resort to quickly
force government concessions. Thus, individuals whose needs are immediate or believe
their window of opportunity is closing are more likely to prefer escalating to violent con-
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flict. I consider three sources of impatience and the perception of unsustainable collective
action—relative food price, urbanization, and spontaneity of demonstrations.
If individuals believe that the state will redress their grievances quickly or mass mobi-
lization is sustainable, they will be more likely to remain peaceful. If, however, they believe
that nonviolent demonstration is proving ineffective or that collective action is unsustain-
able, they will be more apt to engage in violence. Thus, I argue that violence is a result of
the perceived failure of nonviolent collective action. 4
Individuals within a nonviolent demonstration reach their patience thresholds more
quickly when they are increasingly unwilling to wait and see whether nonviolent tactics
will coerce change. The relative food price is one fundamentally important factor in deter-
mining a nonviolent demonstrator’s patience. Food unavailability represents an immediate
need, as individuals comprising opposition groups must be able to feed themselves and their
families. Especially in developing countries, hunger or starvation is an issue that requires
rapid rectification. If nonviolence does not quickly produce concessions in cases of high
food price and low food availability, group members will be more apt to embrace violent
tactics out of desperation. The immediacy of the need for food drives individuals to be-
come impatient with nonviolent tactics, leading to an increased chance of violent escalation.
H1: As a country’s relative food price increases, nonviolent demonstrations are more likely
to escalate to violence.
The degree to which a nonviolent demonstration is sustainable can also affect indi-
viduals’ patience. If a group member believes that nonviolent demonstrations are likely
temporary and at risk of falling apart, she will be more likely to support a tactical switch
to coerce concessions. Conversely, if an individual believes that protests or other nonvi-
olent tactics are likely to continue, she will be more patient and will continue to remain
4 This may seem counterintuitive given the wealth of scholarly work that argues that violent opposition is
a result of solving the collective action problem. It is important to note, however, that my argument applies
to a limited set of violent activities such as riots or isolated terrorist attacks rather than coordinated, sustained
armed conflict.
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peaceful. Under these assumptions, an individual’s participation in nonviolent demonstra-
tion is defined by strategic complementarity, meaning that the more people participate, the
more likely each individual is to contribute (Chwe 2000; Siegel 2009). Therefore, a group
member will believe that nonviolent opposition is sustainable as the potential and probable
number of participants grows.
Since urban settings contain more people and help mitigate the collective action prob-
lem, nonviolent demonstrations that take place in urban areas are more likely to be sus-
tainable. I argue that the perception of sustainability increases individuals’ likelihood of
remaining nonviolent because group members face a lower risk of group collapse. Con-
versely, protests that take place in rural areas may be characterized as unsustainable because
there are fewer pockets of people from which to draw participants. Such rural groups of in-
dividuals will perceive the nonviolent demonstration as fragile and become impatient with
peaceful tactics. Therefore, they may choose to begin using violent tactics to coerce change
before their opportunity to influence government disappears.
H2: If a nonviolent demonstration takes place in an rural area, it is more likely to es-
calate to violence.
One of the main ways that leaders of an opposition group can affect the decisions made
by individual group members is by coordinating demonstrations. The degree to which non-
violent demonstrations are organized or spontaneous can have a large effect on individuals’
perceptions of sustainability. Organized demonstrations suggest that members planned the
opposition in advance, indicating a high level of sophistication and dedication to the cause.
In order for this to occur, groups must generally have a leadership structure that bears the
costs of coordination. Here, leaders send a signal to group members that collective action
is sustainable as a result of their commitment. Out of this, individuals face a lower risk of
group disintegration and can expect demonstrations to continue.
Spontaneous collective action, however, does not have a guaranteed duration or fre-
quency. As a result of the uncertain qualities of unplanned demonstrations, individuals are
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more likely to perceive that the collective action is unsustainable. Spontaneous nonviolent
demonstrations also face a higher risk of group collapse because no leaders exist to bear
significant collective action costs. Thus, in the face of a seemingly temporary window of
influence, individuals are more apt escalate to violence as a last resort.
H3: If a nonviolent demonstration is spontaneous, it is more likely to escalate to violence.
Research Design
To test my hypotheses about the conditions under which a nonviolent demonstration esca-
lates to violence, I will primarily use the Social Conflict Analysis Dataset (SCAD) (Sale-
hyan et al. 2012). SCAD contains event level information on social disturbances such
as protests and riots for Africa and Latin America from 1990-2014. While most conflict
datasets only contain information on large-scale events such as wars or attacks, SCAD cap-
tures different sources of political and social contention. For this study, I limit my sample
to include only events from 2000-2014 that begin as nonviolent antigovernment events. All
observations are measured at the event level. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for all
variables that I include in this analysis.
N Min. Max. 1s Median Mean
Escalation 4322 0 1 1004 0 0.23
Relative Food Price 3396 1.37 11.61 — 6.71 6.41
Location 4322 0 2 — 1 0.97
Polity 4227 -9 10 — 0 0.73
ln(GDPpc) 4238 4.66 9.82 — 7.44 7.32
Repression 4322 0 1 1561 0 0.36
Organized 4322 0 1 1382 0 0.32
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
The dependent variable for this analysis is a binary measure of whether the nonviolent
event escalated to antigovernment violence. To create this variable, I code whether or not
each individual event began nonviolently and escalated to violence. This includes all cases
that began as peaceful demonstrations—both organized and spontaneous—and escalate to
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violent riots or nonstate violence.5
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Fig. 1: Distributions of (a) Relative Food Price, (b) Location, & (c) Organized
The primary independent variable used to assess H1 is the relative food price in a given
country. To measure a state’s relative food price, I use data from the United Nations Food
and Agriculture Organization: Food Security Indicators. Specifically, I use the “V 2.5: Do-
mestic food price index.” This indicator is a measure of consumer cost of food and nonalco-
holic beverages calculated from the World Bank’s 2011 International Comparison Program
and food price indices from the International Labour Organization (ILO). It is measured in
terms of purchasing power parity relative to the United States and controlled for inflation.
Each measure is a ratio of a country’s basket of food-goods in local currency relative to the
same basket of goods in the United States also expressed in local currency. For example,
an individual in a country with a Relative Food Price of 7 pays 7% more on average for
the same good than an individual in the United States. The dataset contains measures for
all countries included in the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) from 2000-2014. The
first panel of Figure 1 shows the distribution of this variable.
To evaluate H2, I use the Locnum variable from SCAD. This measure codes the locality
of the event, which I use as a proxy for the sustainability of contention. I collapse this
measure into a categorical variable coded as 0 if the event is urban, 1 if it is rural, or 2
5 In SCAD, Etype = {1, 2} and Escalation = {3, 4}.
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if it is nationwide.6 I then treat this variable as a factor in all of my regressions. I use
Urban events as the excluded category in order to obtain coefficient estimates for Rural and
National events. The second panel of Figure 1 shows the distribution of events by location.
To test H3 on the effect of the spontaneity of demonstrations, I create a binary measure
of demonstration organization from the Etype variable in SCAD. Here, if the event type is
coded as an organized demonstration, I assign it a value of 1. If it is coded as a spontaneous
demonstration, I assign it a value of 0. I expect the organization of a demonstration to be
negatively associated with the probability of escalation.
I control for several factors that influence whether or not a nonviolent demonstration
escalates to violence. First, I control for regime type in each country using the Polity2
measure from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2002). Regime type in a country
could effect the potential response to a demonstration as well as the constraints on oppo-
sition groups’ decisions. Next, I control for the relative capacity of the government using
per capita GDP. I include this measure because states with various capabilities should ex-
perience different types of opposition dynamics. Finally, I control for whether or not the
government uses violent repression against demonstrators, as this dynamic changes the
decision-making calculus of the group. While I am unable to untangle the sequencing of
events—whether the government represses before or after a demonstration turns violent—I
can condition my results on the occurrence of repression to ensure that any effect I find for
my key independent variables is not simply a violent response to state repression.
To evaluate my hypotheses, I estimate logistic regressions because my dependent vari-
able is dichotomous. I use a pooled time series approach for my main analysis, but my
results are robust to model specification.7
6 I collapse values of Locnum = {1, 2, 4} to 0, Locnum = {3, 5} to 1, and Locnum = {7} to 2.
7 I include both a bivariate model and a model that includes country and year fixed effects in the appendix.
I attempted to estimate a model with random effects and mixed effects, but the model did not converge. I also
attempted to estimate a model with county, year, and country-year fixed effects, but my data do not support
this.
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Results
Table 2 shows the results of two pooled time series logistic regressions of Escalation
using a sample of events across Latin America and Africa from 2000-2014. My original
sample contained over 4,000 observations, but I restrict my sample to 3,347 observations
using casewise deletion of missing values.8 I find strong support for both H1 and H3 and
mixed results for H2.
Baseline No Repression
Intercept −6.96∗ −4.47∗
(0.67) (0.59)
Relative Food Price 0.27∗ 0.24∗
(0.04) (0.03)
Rural 0.27 0.28∗
(0.14) (0.13)
National 1.68∗ 1.98∗
(0.15) (0.13)
Polity −0.01 −0.02∗
(0.01) (0.01)
ln(GDPpc) 0.37
∗ 0.22∗
(0.06) (0.06)
Organized −0.62∗ −0.55∗
(0.12) (0.10)
Repression 2.51∗
(0.10)
AIC 2636.19 3346.70
BIC 2685.12 3389.51
Log Likelihood −1310.09 −1666.35
Deviance 2620.19 3332.70
N 3347 3347
∗p < 0.05
Table 2: Logistic Regression — with and without Repression
I present two models of escalation because of the complications associated with includ-
ing a measure of Repression. In SCAD, repression is coded as a 0 if no repression occurs,
1 for non-lethal repression, and 2 if the government initiates lethal repression. I collapse
this measure into a binary variable coded 1 if any repression occurs and 0 otherwise. In-
cluding this measure of repression in a model of violent escalation is problematic because
it is unclear whether repression is endogenous to the data-generating process. For exam-
ple, the government may initiate repression, causing peaceful demonstrators to fight back.
8 In a future version, I plan to incorporate multiple imputation techniques to ensure that my results are not
biased as a result of non-random missingness.
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This event would be coded as having escalated and experienced repression. Alternatively,
violent escalation may occur in the absence of a response, but the government can initiate
repression after observing violence from the event. This event would also be coded as hav-
ing escalated and experienced repression. Because sequencing is unclear in these events,
it is impossible to tell whether repression is causing escalation or if it is merely a post hoc
government response. Therefore, I estimate two models of violent escalation—one that in-
cludes a measure of repression and one that does not. Overall, my results are robust to the
inclusion of Repression, but the model fits improves when the measure is included.
Leading up to H1, I argued that as the relative food price in a state increases, so should
the likelihood of a nonviolent demonstration escalating to violence. I find strong support for
this hypothesis, as the coefficient on Relative Food Price is positive and statistically differ-
ent from 0 at the p < 0.05 level. I also find that a state’s food price has a large substantive
effect on the likelihood of a nonviolent event becoming violent. Figure 2 shows the pre-
dicted probability of escalation across all observed values of Relative Food Price for urban
events.9 In this plot, the black line represents the point estimate of the predicted probability
of escalation and the blue shaded region shows the 95% confidence interval around that es-
timate. At the lowest observed value of this variable, the predicted probability of escalation
is about 5%. This probability increases to about 15% at its mean, and it jumps to about
38% at its maximum value. Thus, the predicted probability of violent escalation increases
by about 33 percentage points across all observed values of Relative Food Price. As a result
of the statistical and substantive significance, I find strong support for H1, indicating that
as the food price in a country increases, nonviolent demonstrations in that state are more
likely to escalate to violence.
I argued that nonviolent demonstrations occurring in rural areas are more likely to
escalate to violence than urban demonstrations in H2, and I find mixed results for this hy-
pothesis. The coefficient estimates in both models indicate that Rural events are associated
with a higher likelihood of Escalation than Urban events. In the first model with repression
included, I find that the effect of Rural demonstrations is not statistically different from
9 All other variables are held constant at their means.
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Fig. 2: Predicted Probability of Escalation for Values of Relative Food Price
the effect of Urban demonstrations at the 95% confidence level (p = .057). In the second
model with repression excluded, the impact of Rural demonstration is significantly differ-
ent from the impact of Urban demonstration. To illustrate the differential effects of location
on the likelihood of violent escalation, I explore each demonstration setting’s substantive
implications.
Figure 3 shows the predicted probability of escalation across values of Relative Food
Price, broken down by location. Here, each solid line represents the point estimate of the
predicted probability of escalation, and the dashed lines correspond to the 95% confidence
interval around that estimate. The green lines represent National demonstrations, the blue
lines indicate Rural events, and the red lines show Urban demonstrations. For many values
of Relative Food Price, rural demonstrations may appear to be related to a higher predicted
probability of escalation compared to urban demonstrations, as H2 suggests. However, the
two sets of simulated predicted probabilities are indistinguishable from one another in sev-
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eral instances. While the relationship between Rural and Urban demonstrations is in line
with H2, there is too much uncertainly around these estimates to declare them statistically
different from one another. Therefore, I am unable to conclude that rural demonstrations
lead to a higher likelihood of violent escalation than do urban demonstrations.
Interestingly, national demonstrations appear to be more likely than only rural or only
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Fig. 3: Predicted Probability of Escalation for Values of Relative Food Price by Location
urban demonstrations to escalate to violence. This finding directly contradicts my theory
that the perception of sustainable collective action should prevent individuals from desper-
ately switching to violent tactics. I would argue, however, that this finding is a result of a
quirk in the data. It is unclear how a demonstration that is coded as National differs from a
number of separate demonstrations occurring contemporaneously. If simultaneous demon-
strations are coded as one national demonstration, the escalation of one group of protestors
could change the entire coding of that event. Thus, the finding that National demonstrations
have a higher probability of escalating than isolated peaceful protests could just be due to
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the fact that each subnational demonstration has a baseline probability of escalation, and
adding these together strictly increases the predicted probability.
For H3, I argued that spontaneous demonstrations are more likely to result in violent
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Fig. 4: Predicted Probability of Escalation for Values of Organized
escalation. The estimated coefficient on Organized is negative and statistically different
from 0, lending support for this hypothesis. Further, the substantive effect as displayed in
Figure 4 serves as strong evidence that spontaneous demonstrations are more likely escalate
than organized events. When a demonstration is spontaneous, my model predicts roughly a
17% probability of escalation. When an event is organized, however, this probability drops
roughly 7 percentage points to about 10%. Because the predicted probability of violent es-
calation significantly drops between spontaneous and planned demonstrations, my analysis
demonstrates strong support for H3.
I find that two of my control variables are statistically different from 0. First, a country’s
GDP per capita is positively associated with an increased likelihood of violent escalation.
This is a puzzling finding, as we might expect that more capable states experience less vi-
olence in general. As previously mentioned, I also find that the use of repression by the
state increases the likelihood of violent escalation. This finding may be dubious, as the data
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may represent demonstrators initiating violence and the state responding with repression.
The effect size of Repression is large, as the predicted probability of escalation shifts from
about 6% to about 46% when moving from no repression to an event that experiences re-
pression.10 While the occurrence of repression does influence the predicted probability of
escalation, it does not solely drive the results of my primary independent variables.11
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Fig. 5: ROC Curves
To check the overall fit of my models, I explore the discrimination of my logistic re-
gressions using receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves. The ROC curves—shown
in Figure 5—plot the false positive rate (1−specificity) versus the true positive rate (sen-
sitivity) for all possible cutpoints. ROC curves measure how well a statistical test is able
to classify dichotomous outcomes from pre-test conditions. Here, the ROC curves demon-
strate how well my logistic regressions performed at predicting whether or not a nonviolent
event escalated to violence. The black diagonal represents an uninformative model, while
10 See Figure 6 in the Appendix.
11 See Figure 7 in the appendix.
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the dashed curve shows what a perfect model would look like. I calculate the fit of both
of my logistic regressions. The red curve indicates the model that includes a measure of
Repression, and the blue curve shows the fit of the model without the Repression variable.
Clearly, both models outperform the naive model. To determine how well the models fit,
I calculate the area under the curve (AUC) of both ROC curves where the perfect model has
an AUC of 1. I find that the model including Repression has an AUC of .86 and the model
excluding Repression has an AUC of .71. Thus, the model including Repression is better at
discriminating between cases of escalation or non-escalation. However, I remain skeptical
as to whether repression is causing escalation or simply a result of a demonstration’s shift
to violence. Both AUC measures indicate fair to very good model fit, but there is still room
for improvement.
Conclusion
Aggrieved actors often form nonviolent opposition groups in an attempt to gain conces-
sions from the government, but they do not always remain peaceful. Rather than considering
the strategic interaction between an opposition group and a government, I conceptualize a
group’s observed behavior as an aggregation of individual preferences. I argue that peaceful
demonstrations are more likely to escalate to violence when individual members are unsat-
isfied with the effectiveness of nonviolent direct action or believe that collective action is
unsustainable. Specifically, I identify the relative food price in a country, location of the
event, and whether a demonstration is organized or spontaneous as factors that affect indi-
viduals’ decisions of whether or not to engage in violence.
I find strong support for my hypotheses that violent escalation is more likely when the
relative food price increases and when events are spontaneous. I find mixed results for my
hypothesis that events in rural locations are more likely to devolve to violence than events
in urban locations. These findings and my broader theory contribute to the well-established
literatures on civil conflict, nonviolent opposition, and intrastate bargaining.
In spite of my contributions, this project suffers from two key limitations. First, data
unavailability has prevented me from testing my hypotheses at the group level. While it
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is important to know the conditions under which nonviolent demonstrations escalate to vi-
olence, I am also interested in whether or not these tactical switches take hold in more
coordinated groups. For example, if a nonviolent campaign faces the same sorts of con-
straints outlined in this study, would it also be likely to embrace violent tactics? Second,
government repression is certainly an important part of the strategic interaction between a
state and individuals engaged in nonviolent demonstration. Because we are unable to tell
the sequencing of events in these data, we cannot make claims about government repres-
sion’s causal impact on violent escalation. Each of these limitations could be solved with
the emergence of newly collected data.
Aside from projects made possible by new data collection efforts, this study opens sev-
eral future avenues of research. The most important next step in this process is to develop
and test an argument for the government’s decisions. Rather than assuming that the state
initially delays action against a nonviolent opposition, it would be interesting to study the
conditions under which governments choose to delay, initiate repression, or concede. Addi-
tionally, it would be important for future studies to better incorporate the role of leadership
in tactical decision-making. Finally, it would be useful to relax the assumption that oppo-
sition groups prefer to use nonviolent tactics originally. Future work should investigate the
causes of initial tactical decisions.
Beyond academic interests, this project has broad policy implications. Policymakers
should be concerned with factors that influence the onset of violent conflict, and this study
has outlined several characteristics of nonviolent demonstrations that have the potential to
turn violent. My results suggest that food security is an essential component in mitigating
the risk of violent escalation. Therefore, policymakers may craft policies that better assure
food availability in an attempt at conflict prevention.
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Fig. 6: Predicted Probability of Escalation for Values of Repression
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Fig. 7: Predicted Probability of Escalation for Values of Relative Food Price with (a) No Repression
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Bivariate Fixed Effects
(Intercept) −2.34∗
(0.14)
Food Price 0.19∗ 0.62∗
(0.02) (0.18)
Rural −11.01∗
(2.59)
Urban −11.30∗
(2.60)
National −9.67∗
(2.60)
Polity −0.07
(0.04)
ln(GDPpc) 0.63
(0.34)
Repression 2.86∗
(0.12)
Organized −0.44∗
(0.13)
AIC 3777.86 2471.01
BIC 3790.12 2880.77
Log Likelihood −1886.93 −1168.51
Deviance 3773.86 2337.01
N 3396 3347
∗p < 0.05
Table 3: Bivariate and Fixed Effects Logistic Regressions — DV: Escalation
32
Dominican Republic -0.55 Jamaica 1.26
(1.66) (1.51)
Trinidad and Tobago -14.10 Mexico 1.49
(757.43) (1.56)
Guatemala 0.55 Honduras 0.09
(1.05) (1.15)
El Salvador -15.30 Nicaragua 3.57∗
(811.07) (1.28)
Costa Rica -14.55 Panama 0.43
(1410.88) (2.01)
Gambia -0.61 Mali 0.29
(1.17) (0.63)
Senegal 0.09 Benin -15.83
(0.58) (825.03)
Mauritania −3.21∗ Niger 0.16
(0.57) (0.67)
Ivory Coast 0.32 Guinea −1.32∗
(0.69) (0.43)
Burkina Faso -1.39 Sierra Leone 1.96∗
(0.77) (1.00)
Ghana -15.99 Togo 0.57
(1356.90) (0.64)
Cameroon −2.23∗ Nigeria 0.51
(0.81) (0.68)
Gabon 0.53 Chad -0.35
(1.39) (0.84)
Congo -16.65 Uganda 1.06
(3956.18) (0.98)
Kenya 1.52 Tanzania −1.79∗
(1.03) (0.66)
Burundi 0.47 Rwanda -16.04
(0.83) (1405.13)
Angola −4.03∗ Mozambique 2.29∗
(1.42) (0.80)
Zambia −3.49∗ Malawi −1.28∗
(0.70) (0.56)
South Africa 1.72 Lesotho -14.25
(1.58) (1250.71)
Botswana 2.64 Madagascar 0.13
(2.06) (0.67)
Mauritius -15.21 Morocco -0.90
(1841.22) (0.96)
Algeria -0.21 Tunisia 1.35
(1.11) (1.32)
Egypt -0.39
(0.74)
∗p < 0.05 Excluded country: Haiti
Table 4: Country Fixed Effects
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Year Fixed Effect
2001 −0.26
(0.35)
2002 0.53
(0.32)
2003 0.03
(0.33)
2004 −0.01
(0.33)
2005 0.15
(0.36)
2006 −0.23
(0.41)
2007 −0.13
(0.45)
2008 −1.03∗
(0.49)
2009 −0.11
(0.44)
2010 −0.74
(0.45)
2011 −1.12∗
(0.49)
2012 −0.17
(0.46)
2013 0.37
(0.48)
2014 −0.29
(0.51)
∗p < 0.05 Excluded year: 2000
Table 5: Year Fixed Effects
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